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Few economic theories have been studied as extensively as the Ricardian model of inter-
national trade, which is now almost two centuries old. Nonetheless, within this model the
relationship between trade openness and Total Factor Productivity (TFP) has generally been
overlooked. One possible reason is that the standard model without externalities and distor-
tions, while implying that trade is always welfare improving, delivers ambiguous predictions
about the e⁄ect of trade on TFP. In particular, it is possible to construct simple examples
in which one country holds a comparative advantage in the production of low-productivity
goods, so that its TFP declines after removing trade barriers. Yet, growing and robust em-
pirical evidence ￿ especially studies based on ￿rm-level data ￿ points out that trade has a
signi￿cant positive impact on TFP.1 This raises some intriguing questions: is there any key
feature of the open economy missing in the Ricardian model? Or, rather, are the examples
in which TFP does not rise so special that they can be safely disregarded?
In this paper we provide a thorough analysis the relationship between trade and TFP in
the Ricardian model and show that the latter interpretation is correct. We address this issue
building on the most general version of the model, with many countries and a continuum of
goods, developed by Eaton and Kortum (2002; EK hereafter). We show that trade openness
may reduce TFP only if industry productivities (country technologies) in di⁄erent countries
are highly correlated and their joint distribution does not belong to the families that are
most commonly used in the literature, such as the FrØchet, Pareto, normal, and lognormal.
In contrast, if industry productivities in di⁄erent countries are independent, trade openness
raises TFP for any distribution of technologies; for the families of distributions mentioned
above, TFP rises for any degree of correlation.
Key to these results is the fact that the selection e⁄ect of international competition
favors the survival of industries with, on average, higher productivity. We show that the
comparison between the TFP under autarky and the TFP of an open economy boils down
to a comparison between a simple mean and a conditional mean, where the conditioning
event ￿ that domestic industries survive international competition ￿ tends to lift TFP after
opening to trade.
Examples in which international competition induces an "adverse" selection in favor
of industries with low productivity can still be constructed, but they crucially require a
high positive correlation among country technologies. The continuum-of-good assumption
and the probabilistic representation of productivities unveil that comparative advantages are
1Among the most in￿ uential papers see Bernard and Jensen (1999), Frankel and Romer (1999), Pavcnik
(2002), Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003), Dollar and Kraay (2003), and AlacalÆ and Ciccone
(2004). For a recent survey with an emphasis on ￿rm-level data see Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott
(2007).
5inversely related to the correlations between technologies. High correlations correspond, for
any country, to low comparative advantages, a small TFP gain from trade (i.e. the ratio
between the open economy￿ s and the autarky￿ s TFPs), and a narrow scope for international
trade. The result that under independence TFP always raises is just a consequence of this
insight. For the families of distributions mentioned above correlation still matters, because it
determines the size of the TFP gain from trade, but the latter is always positive and vanishes
as correlation becomes perfect.
With FrØchet distributed technologies as in EK, we also characterize the TFP of the
tradeable sector in an open economy with a very compact expression that sheds light on its
determinants. An increase in TFP may be due to "genuine" domestic technological progress,
or it may re￿ ect other factors such as an improvement in the technologies of competitor
countries, loosening trade barriers (including the entry of new competitors), declining foreign
input costs, or rising domestic input costs. All these factors raise the TFP through the
selection e⁄ect, by a⁄ecting the share of low-productivity industries that are forced to exit.
TFP gains from trade are also increasing in the dispersion of industry productivities that,
together with correlation, is related to the extent of comparative advantages.
Throughout the paper, we de￿ne the TFPs of closed and open economies as the ￿rst
moments of the corresponding distributions of industry productivities. If consumers have CES
preferences and productivities follow the most common distributions used in the literature,
we show that this de￿nition is appropriate in the extreme cases of autarky and absent trade
barriers. The average of industry productivities weighted by the value of industry outputs,
in fact, is proportional to the ￿rst moment of the distribution. The proportionality constant
gathers the whole e⁄ect of consumer preferences ￿ with more substitutability among goods
increasing the weight of high-productivity industries and raising the weighted TFP ￿ and
cancels out when we compute the TFP gain of free trade versus autarky. This gain re￿ ects
a "pure" selection e⁄ect, as the weights of the industries that eventually die are reallocated
proportionally to the surviving ones. In the intermediate case of positive but ￿nite trade
barriers, the TFP gain from trade features an additional e⁄ect, that has always a non-negative
sign, given by the reallocation of market shares towards exporters.
Focusing on the selection e⁄ect, we also provide a result that has compelling empirical
implications. We show that the TFP of the open economy is equal to the autarky TFP,
augmented by a measure of trade openness that requires only data on production and trade.
Thus, the selection e⁄ect can be easily quanti￿ed. We perform such measurement for a
sample of 41 countries with annual data in the period 1985-2005. Averaging across countries,
we ￿nd that in 1985 international competition raised manufacturing TFP by 6 percent above
the autarky level.2 Not surprisingly, due to enhanced trade integration, this contribution
2When we bring the model to the data, our de￿nition of tradeable sector boils down to the manufacturing
sector.
6exhibits a neat positive time trend, shared by most countries, growing to as much as 11
percent in 2005. In the cross-section, however, TFP gains from trade vary widely.3
Our paper is closely related to Melitz (2003) (and the subsequent literature, including
Chaney, 2008, and Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008), who also derives a positive relationship be-
tween trade and TFP.4 There are, however, two key di⁄erences. First, we obtain the result
with perfect competition, whereas Melitz assumes monopolistic competition. Second, here
selection is driven by comparative advantages, as is to be expected within the Ricardian ap-
proach. Therefore, not only low- but also high-productivity domestic industries can exit the
market (and be replaced by imports from foreign industries), although with lower probabil-
ities, so that removing trade barriers generates some "action" along the whole distribution
of productivities. In Melitz, instead, all and only the ￿rms whose productivity is below a
certain threshold exit the market after trade barriers decline.5 To stress these di⁄erences,
we describe this mechanism with the expression Ricardian selection instead of self-selection.
The latter denomination is common in the monopolistic competition literature, where low-
productivity ￿rms really self-select by refraining from producing or exporting whenever they
expect negative pro￿ts. In the Ricardian model, instead, international competition forces
both low- and high-productivity industries to exit.
Our ￿ndings also bring this paper close to the literature that emphasizes the role
of institutions (or "social infrastructure", as in Hall and Jones, 1999) in explaining TFP
di⁄erences across countries. Examples include Conway and Nicoletti (2006) and Lagos (2006),
who show that higher regulation in the non-tradeable sector and in the labor market lowers
the TFP of the tradeable sector. Our analysis shows, in contrast, that higher regulation, by
rising domestic costs and forcing low-productivity industries to exit, has the opposite e⁄ect.
In addition, the role of other factors, such as proximity to high-TFP countries (in other words,
geography), also emerges.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 o⁄ers a brief outline of the EK
3Our analysis focuses on the e⁄ect of trade on the TFP of the tradeable sector only ￿ an e⁄ect that the
Ricardian model allows to express analytically and quantify. We discuss implications for the TFP of the whole
economy, however, when it is pertinent.
4Other close relatives of this paper are Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) and Waugh (2008).
The former analyzes trade and productivity with Bertrand competition, but does not derive a closed-form
expression for the aggregate TFP. The latter builds a variant of the EK model with traded intermediate goods
and non-traded ￿nal goods and measures the contribution of trade to cross-country income di⁄erences. This
contribution turns out to be small, but this is due to the fact that poor countries face higher costs of exporting
then rich countries; removing these asymmetries would lower income di⁄erences by about a half.
5With the assumption of constant returns to scale, Ricardian models leave the size of ￿rms indeterminate,
as the equilibrium pins down only the size of the whole industry. Hence, the comparison between monopolistic
competition and Ricardian models is loose. The former, in fact, focuses on ￿rms that produce heterogeneous
goods (and analyzes intra-industry trade), while the latter focuses on industries, with an industry de￿ned as
the ￿rm or set of ￿rms (with identical productivities) that produces an homogeneous good.
7model. Section 3 presents our main theoretical results about trade and TFP. In Section 4
we elaborate on our results, providing some intuition and extending them to more general
distributional assumptions. In Section 5 we analyze the weighted TFP in closed and open
economies. In Section 6 we quantify the magnitude of the selection e⁄ect on the TFP of the
manufacturing sector. Section 7 concludes.
2 An outline of the Eaton-Kortum model
EK consider a Ricardian framework with N countries (N > 1) and a continuum of tradeable
goods produced with constant-returns-to-scale technologies. Denote by zi (j) > 0 the e¢ -
ciency of country i in producing the tradeable good j, with i 2 f1;:::;Ng and j 2 [0;+1);
namely: qi (j) = zi (j) ￿ Ii (j), where qi (j) is the amount of good j produced by country i
and Ii (j) is the bundle of inputs, which combines labor and intermediate goods, needed to
produce that output.
The key hypothesis is that each zi (j) is the realization of a country-speci￿c random
variable Zi. Speci￿cally, it is assumed that for any country i: Zi ￿ Fr￿ echet(Ti;￿), with
Ti > 0, ￿ > 1, and fZig
N
i=1 mutually independent. Due to the continuum-of-goods assumption
and applying the law of large numbers, the share of goods for which country i￿ s e¢ ciency




where Fi denotes the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of Zi.6
EK show that the parameters Ti and ￿ are the theoretical counterparts, in a context
with many countries and a continuum of goods, of the Ricardian concepts of absolute and
comparative advantages. Ti, to which we will refer as state of technology, captures country
i￿ s absolute advantages: an increase in Ti relative to Tn implies an increase in the share of
goods that country i produces more e¢ ciently than country n. In turn, ￿ is inversely related
to the dispersion of Zi and is a measure of the precision of the distribution.7 Its connection
with the concept of comparative advantage stems from the fact that, in Ricardo, gains from
trade depend on heterogeneities in technologies across countries. In this perspective, EK
demonstrate that a decrease in ￿ (i.e. higher heterogeneity in each country), coupled with
mutual independence, generates larger gains from trade for all countries. The extension of
our results to correlated distributions, presented in Section 4, is also helpful to clarify that
6Kortum (1997) and Eaton and Kortum (2009) show that the FrØchet distribution emerges from a dynamic
model in which, at each point in time: (i) the number of ideas that arrive about how to produce a good
follows a Poisson distribution; (ii) the e¢ ciency conveyed by each idea is a random variable with a Pareto
distribution; (iii) ￿rms produce goods using always the best idea that has arrived to them. Jones (2005) shows
that this set up on the ￿ ow of ideas entails two other results: the global production function is Cobb-Douglas
and technical change in the long run is labor-augmenting.
7Ti and ￿ are related to both the mean and the variance of Zi. Denoting Euler￿ s Gamma function by ￿,
the moment of order k of Zi, which exists only if ￿ > k, is T
k=￿
i ￿ ￿[(￿ ￿ k)=￿].
8comparative advantages are related to both the heterogeneity of technologies within countries
and the correlation of technologies between countries.
A second set of assumptions concerns input costs and trade barriers. The cost of
the bundle of inputs in country i is denoted by ci and it is split into wages and prices of
intermediate goods. Trade barriers are modeled as Samuelson￿ s iceberg costs: delivering one
unit of good from country i to country n requires producing dni units, with dni > 1 for
i 6= n and dii = 1 for any i. By arbitrage, trade barriers obey the triangle inequality, so that
dni ￿ dnk ￿ dki for any n, i and k.
As for the market structure, the model assumes perfect competition. Together with
the assumptions on costs and technologies, perfect competition implies that the price of one
unit of good j produced by country i and delivered to country n is: pni (j) = cidni=zi (j). In
country n each good j is purchased from the country that provides it at the lowest price, i.e.:
pn (j) = min
i=1;:::;N
fpni (j)g .
Consumers maximize a standard CES utility function, with elasticity of substitution
given by ￿ > 1, subject to the usual constraint that total spending cannot be larger than
total income.
With this set of assumptions, EK prove two fundamental properties of the model. First,
the market share of country i in country n ￿ i.e. the ratio between the value of the imports
of country n from country i (Xni) and the value of the total expenditure (or total absorption)












This share is increasing in the state of technology Ti and decreasing in the input cost ci and
the trade barrier dni. Its value depends also on the technologies, costs and trade barriers of
any other country k: it increases with costs ck and distances dnk, and decreases if technologies
Tk increase.
Second, the exact price index of the bundle of tradeable goods in country n resulting
from the CES aggregator and the prices pn (j) is:
pn = ￿ ￿ ￿￿1=￿








with ￿ denoting Euler￿ s Gamma function and ￿ > ￿ ￿ 1.
This setup is completed with two further assumptions. The ￿rst is that intermedi-
ate inputs comprise the full set of tradeable goods aggregated with the CES function with






9where wi is the nominal wage in country i and pi is given by equation (2). The second
assumption is that there is also a non-tradeable sector in the economy; thus, market shares,
prices, and wages de￿ned above are referred to the tradeable sector only.
These two further assumptions enable EK to solve the model for equilibrium prices and
quantities in two polar cases. In one case, labor is mobile between the tradeable and non-
tradeable sectors; in the other, it is immobile. In both cases, it is assumed that a constant
fraction ￿ 2 (0;1) of the aggregate ￿nal expenditure is spent on tradeable goods. The solution
of the model, then, is given by a system of non-linear equations, with parameters dni, Ti,
￿, ￿ and ￿ (see EK, pp. 1756-1758).8 Because of non-linearities, there is no closed-form
solution. Nevertheless, it is possible to simulate the model and analyze some counterfactuals
or rearrange the main equations in order to obtain testable implications. In the following,
we keep on building on the theoretical model and show how we can use it in order to derive
a theoretical expression for the TFP of tradeables.
3 TFP in open economy
In general, the TFP of a country is the average productivity across the industries that are
actually engaged in production. Under autarky, production occurs over the entire range of
goods. Then, the TFP of the tradeable sector of country i is the unconditional mean of Zi,
i.e. the mean across all tradeable goods. In the open economy, instead, any country produces
only the goods in which it holds a comparative advantage. In this case, the TFP of the
tradeable sector of country i must be obtained by computing the mean of Zi only across the
goods that are actually produced by domestic industries, thus excluding the goods that are
imported because i is not su¢ ciently competitive.
In order to ￿nd out the productivity distribution for the industries that are su¢ ciently
productive as to survive foreign competition, we can resort to the model. Denote the ran-
dom variable that describes the productivities of the surviving industries by Zi;o, where the
subscript o stands for the open economy; its c.d.f. is:
Fi;o (z) ￿ Pr(Zi;o < z) = Pr
￿





where Pik is the random variable that describes the prices pik (j) for any i and k (including
i = k). Equation (4) establishes that the goods j eventually produced by country i are all
and only those for which pii (j) ￿ pik (j) for any k. This point requires a formal proof. On
one hand, if j is such that pii (j) ￿ pik (j) for any k, then country i can sell j with the lowest
8Alvarez and Lucas (2007) generalize the model by considering distinct ￿nal and intermediate goods, and
distinguishing between tari⁄s and transport costs. Then, they provide su¢ cient conditions for existence and
uniqueness of the equilibrium.
10price on the domestic market and, therefore, will certainly produce it.9 On the other hand,
if pii (j) > pik (j) then country i cannot charge the lowest price for j on the domestic market
and, as a consequence of the triangle inequality, it is unable to provide the best deal on
foreign markets either, thus it will not produce j at all (this intuitive step is formally proven
in Appendix A). Computing Fi;o yields the following result:
Proposition 1 If technologies are FrØchet distributed and markets for tradeable goods are
perfectly competitive, then:
Zi;o ￿ Fr￿ echet(￿i;￿) ,
where









Proof. See Appendix A.1
Thus, the variable Zi;o is FrØchet distributed, with mean:








E (Zi;o), a monotone function of ￿i, provides a theoretical expression for the TFP of the open
economy (denoted by TFPi;o), while E (Zi) is the TFP under autarky (TFPi). Therefore, we





















Note that, although we compute the TFP of country i by averaging zi (j) across goods j,
we are not summing up "apples and oranges". While our measure of TFP depends on the
physical units chosen to measure the di⁄erent goods, we de￿ne these units in the same way
as they enter the utility function.11 In particular, with CES preferences, we are averaging
productivities measured in physical units that enter the utility function in a completely
symmetric way.12
9Given the continuity of the random variables considered here (i.e. of Zi and, as a consequence, of Pik),
we can neglect events of the type pii (j) = pik (j), since they have zero probability.
10In a related paper, Finicelli, Pagano, and Sbracia (2009a) build on this theoretical result in order to
measure TFPs of the tradeable sector of 18 OECD countries, relative to that of the United States.
11Summing the zi (j) across di⁄erent goods is an essential operation to solve the EK model for equilibrium
prices and quantities. Think for example of the price index pi, which is nothing but an average of the zi (j)
(see, for instance, equation (21)).
12Demidova and Rodr￿guez-Clare (2009) provide a very elegant treatment of this issue. In particular, they
de￿ne the quantities qi (j) that enter the utility function as: qi (j) = ￿i (j) ~ qi (j), where ~ qi (j) is the "raw
quantity" of good j and ￿i (j) is a function that accounts for of the di⁄erent ways in which ~ qi (j) can be
measured. Hence, changing the unit of measurement for ~ qi (j) determines a corresponding change in ￿i (j), so
that qi (j) remains unaltered.
11The main implication of Proposition 1 is that ￿i > Ti, therefore E (Zi;o) > E (Zi).13
In other words, the model predicts that the TFP of the open economy is larger that the TFP
under autarky. The next section is entirely devoted to explaining and extending this result.
Before that, it is worth noting that the proposition also sheds light on the factors that a⁄ect
the TFP in an open economy.
Equation (P1) shows that, in an open economy, ￿i depends not only on Ti, but also on
the technologies, costs, and trade barriers of all the other countries, as well as on domestic
costs. This result can be readily explained. Suppose that Tk increases for some k 6= i. Country
k, then, produces and exports more goods than before (equation (1)), partly crowding out
production in country i. The productivity of the goods that keep being produced in country
i, however, is higher, on average, than the one of the goods whose production has been
displaced, hence the fact that ￿i > Ti. The e⁄ects of domestic input costs and of iceberg
costs follow the same mechanics. A larger ci crowds out production in country i in favor of
its competitors, but its own average productivity increases (by the same token, the e⁄ect of
an increase in foreign input costs ck on country i￿ s average productivity is opposite). Higher
dik narrow the range of goods imported by country i, keeping alive industries with a lower
average productivity. Note that as dik go to +1 for all k 6= i ￿ i.e. as the country tends to
autarky ￿ then ￿i tends to Ti.
The positive relationship between aggregate productivity and domestic costs contrasts
with the results of Lagos (2006) and Conway and Nicoletti (2006). In the EK model, if a
country pays higher wages or incurs larger costs because of distorted labor or non-tradeable
product markets, then the selection e⁄ect of international competition forces ine¢ cient in-
dustries to exit, raising aggregate productivity.14 On the contrary, in Lagos and in Conway
and Nicoletti distorted markets cause an adverse selection of productive units, hampering the
e¢ ciency of their allocation and, in turn, reducing aggregate productivity. Assessing the net
e⁄ect of these distortions on TFP, then, remains essentially an empirical question.15
13By the properties of the FrØchet distribution, the stronger implication that Zi;o ￿rst-order stochastically
dominates Zi follows immediately.
14Note that this improvement of TFP comes together with fewer exporters and lower market shares. It
should also be clear that the larger deadweight losses associated to, e.g., higher ￿ring costs in the labor
market or lower degree of competition in the non-tradeable sector imply that increasing domestic costs is not
a recommended policy prescription to raise TFP. More in general, these examples provide further evidence of
the fact that, in an open economy, an increase (decrease) in TFP is not necessarily associated with an increase
(decrease) in welfare (see also footnote 16).
15Chari, Restuccia, and Urrutia (2005) focus on another mechanism through which more frictions in the
labor market raise the ￿ measured￿TFP (proxied by income per worker). In their paper, the result occurs
because higher ￿ring costs increase the level of training that ￿rms provide to workers, raising human capital
and, in turn, the measured TFP. They also provide prima facie evidence that the relationship between the
level of employment protection and the TFP across European countries is positive. Our results, then, provide
an alternative explanation of the same ￿ndings based on the role of international competition.
12By recalling the expressions of costs (equation (3)) and prices (equation (2)), Propo-
sition 1 also shows that changes in technologies, costs and trade barriers do not have only
a "direct" selection e⁄ect on TFP. International competition yields also second- and higher-
order e⁄ects via changes in input costs. Consider, for instance, an increase in the foreign
technology Tk. The increase in Tk, by making available cheaper goods in country k, lowers
also its input costs ck further enhancing its external competitiveness and providing an addi-
tional boost to the TFP of country i. This e⁄ect is partly o⁄set by the availability of cheaper
inputs in country i (i.e. by a decline in ci), but is reinforced by lower input costs in countries
other than i and k.16
Proposition 1 also shows that the bene￿ts of technological progress in one country are
not spread evenly on the TFP of other countries. The extent to which TFP changes following
a change in foreign technologies and costs re￿ ects the size of domestic relative to foreign costs
and, inversely, that of domestic trade barriers. For instance, an increase in the technology
of the United States will have a stronger (weaker) impact on closer (more distant) countries.
By the same token, since the TFP in country i changes as trade barriers change, equation
(P1) suggests that looking at the dynamics of TFP growth could misrepresent the picture
about "genuine" technological developments during periods in which countries liberalize or
place restrictions on international trade.
Equation (P1) is theoretically appealing but also rather di¢ cult to apply in empirical
studies, since it requires data on technologies, costs, and trade barriers for all countries.
However, a very helpful expression for ￿i can be derived by exploiting the fact that countries￿
technologies, costs, and trade barriers combine uniquely into the geographical distribution of
production and trade data. In particular, we can prove that:
















Proof. See Appendix A.2
Hence, ￿i is equal to Ti augmented by a factor that depends on the ratio between the
value of country i￿ s aggregate imports (IMPi) and the value of its production (PROi) net of
aggregate exports (EXPi). Let us write:




16In the version considered here, the model ignores the possibility of technology spillovers across countries.
In fact, the Zi￿ s are independent random variables and the Ti￿ s can change in an unrelated fashion. Rodr￿guez-
Clare (2007) extends the model to account for international di⁄usion of ideas. A similar route would be to
consider correlated Zi￿ s (see the next section).
13￿i is the ratio between country i￿ s total absorption (or total domestic demand) and its
production sold domestically. Therefore, ￿i is a measure of trade openness for country i.
Note that, consistently with equation (P1), as dik go to +1 for all k 6= i then imports and
exports go to zero and ￿i tends to Ti.
Proposition 2 provides an interesting contribution to the literature concerning the mea-
sures of trade openness. Papers exploring the relationship between trade and productivity
typically measure trade openness as the sum of nominal imports and exports scaled by the
nominal GDP (nominal openness). An exception is AlcalÆ and Ciccone (2004) who scale nom-
inal imports and exports with the GDP in PPP US dollars (real openness), on the ground
of theoretical motivations. Our analysis ￿nds that the Ricardian trade theory suggests to
measure trade openness with ￿i. Equation (P2), in fact, shows that ￿i is the trade-related
variable that summarizes the e⁄ects of international competition on TFP. By comparing
equation (P2) with equation (P1), it is evident that ￿i takes into account the factors related
to domestic and foreign costs that are considered by AlcalÆ and Ciccone.
The wide availability of production and trade data makes it easy to compute ￿i and
quantify the magnitude of the selection e⁄ect for several countries and years. Before turning
to the empirical analysis, however, we focus on the prediction that openness raises TFP,
providing further insights about how and why this happens and exploring possible extensions
of this result.
4 Intuition and extensions
The main implication of Proposition 1 is that TFP always rises when trade barriers are
removed. This is a remarkable di⁄erence with respect to previous Ricardian models, where
the law of comparative advantage may lead a country to specialize in the production of low-
productivity goods, a situation in which aggregate TFP would diminish after opening to
trade.
To build an intuition about our new result, let us retain only the essential ingredients
of the model. Consider a simple case with two countries (n and i), no trade barriers (i.e.
dni = din = 1), no intermediate goods (￿ = 1), and identical input costs (i.e. cn = ci = 1).17
These assumptions simplify the distribution of the productivities of the surviving industries
(that we have computed for the general case in Proposition 1), as they imply that country i
produces good j if and only if zi (j)=zn (j) ￿ 1. In addition, with no trade barriers producers
17Even though in the model costs are endogenous (which would prevent us from setting arbitrary values for
ci and cn), we can build examples that yield cn = ci = 1. An obvious way is to assume perfectly symmetric
countries where, in particular, Ti = Tn. However, even Ti 6= Tn could still yield cn = ci = 1 if, for instance, the
sizes of the labor force in the two countries are di⁄erent. We strongly stress, however, that these simplifying
assumptions are by no means necessary for the arguments made in this section.
14and exporters coincide, making our task of providing some intuition easier.
The ￿rst important feature of the mechanism through which selection raises TFP in the
Ricardian model is that any industry can survive or die after openness, and the probability
that each industry survives (dies) is increasing (decreasing) in its own productivity. In fact,
using both mutual independence and FrØchet distribution of technologies, the probability of











for z > 0 ,
which is always included in the open interval (0;1) and strictly increasing in z. (Its com-
plement to 1, the probability that the industry dies, is always decreasing in z.) This is an
interesting di⁄erence with respect to the model of Melitz (2003) in which that probability
is either 0 or 1, depending on whether the ￿rm￿ s productivity is below or above the thresh-
old that separates incumbents from entrants. The reason for this di⁄erence is that the EK
model is governed by the law of comparative advantage. Therefore, any industry, even a
high-productivity one, can exit the market and it does so if the good that it produces is
made more e¢ ciently in the rival country; this happens, however, with a probability that is
lower for higher-productivity industries. Specularly, even a very low-productivity domestic
industry survives if its own good is made more e¢ ciently than in the other country ￿ but
its probability of surviving is lower than for higher-productivity industries.
Second, the selection e⁄ect makes the model consistent with the "exceptional export
performance" documented by Bernard and Jensen (1999). Let us temporarily re-introduce
trade barriers (otherwise all producers would also export). Good j is made in country i if
and only if zi (j)=zn (j) ￿ d￿1
in . In addition, if zi (j)=zn (j) ￿ dni, then the good j is also
exported by country i to country n (otherwise, the good j is sold only domestically). With
mutually independent and FrØchet distributed technologies, and following steps similar to
those illustrated in Appendix A to prove Proposition 1, we can show that the distribution
of the productivities of exporters is FrØchet, with state Ti + Tn ￿ d￿
ni and precision ￿. Ap-
plying Proposition 1 to this simpli￿ed setup, we ￿nd that the distribution of the whole set
of surviving industries is FrØchet with state Ti + Tn ￿ d￿￿
in and precision ￿. Since both dni
and din are larger than 1, then the average productivity of exporters is higher than the TFP
of the whole economy (the latter being the average productivity across all the industries
that survive international competition, i.e. exporters and producers that sell only domesti-
cally).18 As in monopolistic competition models, the reason why exporters are, on average,
more productive is that their goods have to be competitive enough to overcome trade bar-
riers. However, analogously to what discussed above, the mechanisms behind selection in
the two models are not identical. In Melitz, exporters and non-exporters are separated by a
productivity threshold; therefore, even the worst exporter has always a higher productivity
18It follows trivially that the average productivity of exporters is also higher than the average productivity
of non-exporters.
15than the best non-exporter. In the Ricardian model, instead, as a consequence of the law of
comparative advantage, few "bad" exporters and "good" non-exporters coexist with many
"good" exporters and "bad" non-exporters.
Are these predictions robust to the distributional assumptions? Let us go back to the
simpli￿ed framework with no trade barriers. The main result that TFP rises after removing
trade barriers can be formally written as:
E (ZijZi ￿ Zn) ￿ E (Zi) . (7)
Inequality (7) makes it clear that the comparison between the TFP of an open economy and
the TFP under autarky boils down to a comparison between a conditional mean and a simple
mean. The conditioning event is that domestic industries are better than foreign industries
(or "su¢ ciently better", if there are trade barriers and heterogeneous input costs). This
condition is what "tends" to raise TFP after opening to trade.
However, (7) does not hold for all possible joint distributions of Zi and Zn. A simple
way to build a counterexample in which (7) is not satis￿ed is the following. Take any random
variable Zi, and construct a variable Zn such that when Zi takes values higher (lower) than
its own mean, then Zn is higher (lower) than Zi. In this case, Zi ￿ Zn only for values of Zi
lower than its unconditional mean, therefore E (ZijZi ￿ Zn) < E (Zi).19
The key feature of this counterexample is that Zi and Zn are not independent, but
positively correlated. This positive correlation is an obstacle that hampers TFP growth after
opening to international trade. The continuum-of-goods assumption and the probabilistic
representation of productivities, then, unveil the role of correlation in determining the sign
and the size of TFP growth ￿ a role that is crucial also in Ricardian models where those
two characteristics are absent.
Consider for instance a two-country two-good model and let us play with the statement
"country i holds a comparative advantage in the production of low-productivity good 1", a
condition under which the TFP of country i declines. By labeling good 1 as "low productiv-
ity", we are implicitly assuming that both countries make good 1 with a lower productivity
than good 2. (If 1 was a low-productivity good only for country i, this country could not
have a comparative advantage in making that good.) Since zi (1) < E (Zi) < zi (2) and
zn (1) < E (Zn) < zn (2), then technologies in the two countries are positively correlated.
The previous counterexample, which featured more than just two goods, was obtained
simply by coupling positive correlation with the condition that one country is systematically
19Note that after opening to international trade, welfare increases also in countries where TFP declines. The
reason is that a lower TFP is more than compensated by lower consumer prices. Demidova and Rodr￿guez-
Clare (2009) show examples in which, by the same token, welfare falls despite higher productivity. Using a
monopolistic competition model for a small economy, they also decompose welfare gains into four factors:
productivity, terms of trade, product varieties, and heterogeneity across varieties.
16better than the other in making low-productivity goods. With this case in mind, consider
now the e⁄ect of imposing independence on the distributions of Zi and Zn. Independence
has two main consequences: (i) it shrinks the set of goods that both countries make with low
productivity; (ii) it prevents one country from being systematically better than the other in
producing these goods.20
Thus, not surprisingly, independence between Zi and Zn is a su¢ cient condition for
(7) to hold, irrespectively of the shape of the distribution of Zi and Zn (see Appendix C, for
details). In other words, under mutual independence TFP always rises after opening to trade.
In particular, the result holds for all the distributions, like Pareto, normal, lognormal, and,
of course, the FrØchet, that are commonly used to describe productivities at the industry or
￿rm level and that entail very simple analytic solutions for this model.21
While independence is su¢ cient for TFP to increase, it is by no means necessary. More
importantly, we show that TFP rises irrespectively of the degree of correlation between coun-
try technologies for some multivariate families that yield, as marginals, the aforementioned
FrØchet, Pareto, normal, and lognormal. The intuition is that assuming such families of
distributions prevents one country from being systematically better than the other in pro-
ducing low-productivity goods, even though the set of these goods can be quite "large" (i.e.
the correlation can be close to 1). It holds, however, that the TFP gain is lower for higher
correlations.22
Let us consider the multivariate FrØchet case in detail, with a simple extension that
covers all levels of dependence, from independence to perfect correlation. Suppose that the
random vector (Zi;Zn) has the following c.d.f.:













where ￿i;n (zi;zn) = Pr(Zi < zi;Zn < zn) and r 2 (0;1]. This distribution yields two FrØchet
as marginals (with parameters respectively equal to (Ti;￿) and (Tn;￿)) and is suggested in
EK for an extension of their model to correlated technologies.23 The parameter r is an "index
20By the same token, negative correlation would imply that when a country makes a good with a low
productivity, then the other makes it with a high productivity, leading to even larger TFP gains in both
countries. In the following, we show this result formally in the case of normally distributed technologies.
21The result that (7) holds under independence is very important for at least two reasons. First, indepen-
dence is a standard assumption in models of growth and trade with multiple countries. Second, while this
assumption is not appealing for empirical purposes, it is still very useful for developing the theory in the case
of correlated distributions. In fact, it is often possible to ￿nd simple joint transformations of the variables
such that the transformed variables become independent. In Appendix D, we exploit precisely this property
to show that (7) also holds for some families of multivariate distributions that allow for correlated marginals.
22To the extent that the international di⁄usion of ideas raises the correlation between country technologies,
our ￿ndings are consistent with Rodr￿guez-Clare (2007), who shows that the gains from trade are smaller when
di⁄usion is included in the EK model.
23Introduced by Tawn (1990), ￿i;n is also known as asymmetric bivariate logistic distribution and is com-
17of independence" and is inversely related to the correlation between Zi and Zn: if r = 1, then
Zi and Zn are independent (the case examined above); if r < 1, then Zi and Zn are positively
correlated. As r goes to 0, the correlation between Zi and Zn tends to 1; in this case, we
know from standard Ricardian theory that there are no comparative advantages to exploit
and, therefore, both countries produce exactly as in autarky. Using (8), we can show that
the TFP gain of country i, i.e. the increase in its TFP with respect to autarky, is:24










Hence, E (ZijZi ￿ Zn) ￿ E (Zi) always.25 Let us analyze this gain in two separate cases:
Ti = Tn and Ti 6= Tn.
Figure 1 shows, for Ti=Tn = 1, the TFP gain of country i for di⁄erent values of ￿ and
r.26 We know from EK that welfare gains from trade are decreasing in ￿; the ￿gure shows
that the same applies to TFP gains. With independent distributions, the TFP gain from
trading with a symmetric country, i.e. one that has the same state of technology, goes from
7 percent (with ￿ = 10) to 19 percent (with ￿ = 4). In addition, for any value of ￿ the TFP
gain is monotonically decreasing in the correlation between the technologies of i and n (or
increasing in r).
Figure 2 shows the TFP gain for di⁄erent values of r and Ti=Tn, given ￿ = 6:67 (our
reference value in the next section). Not surprisingly, the TFP gain is larger, the higher
the productivity of the competitor country. If, for example, Ti=Tn = 0:5 the TFP gain for
country i is as high as 18 percent with independent distributions, and goes down to 0 very
slowly as r decreases; with r = 0:1 the TFP gain is still 11 percent. On the other hand, if
Ti=Tn = 2 the TFP gain is at most 7 percent, and goes to zero more rapidly as r tends to
zero. As before, the TFP gain decreases as correlation increases.
In order to show that the previous results are not speci￿c to the multivariate FrØchet,
but also hold for other families of distributions, we brie￿ y illustrate TFP gains with nor-
mally distributed technologies.27 Appendix D, provides other examples based on bivariate
monly used in multivariate extreme value theory.
24See Appendix D, for details.
25An inspection of equation (9) reveals the important property that the TFP gain for two countries with
correlated technologies and given values of Ti=Tn, ￿ and r (with r < 1) is the same as the TFP gain for
two countries with independent technologies, a state-of-technology ratio equal to (Ti=Tn)
1=r, and a precision
parameter equal to ￿=r. Thus, we do not need to generalize Propositions 1 and 2 to the case of correlated
FrØchet distributions: one can simply use the TFP gains derived under independence and obtain those under
positive correlation with an appropriate rescaling of the parameters.
26Section 6 explains why we have placed ￿ in a range between 4 and 10.
27This is quite a di⁄erent case with respect to the FrØchet, given that the normal is a symmetric light-tailed
distribution, that also allows to deal easily with negatively correlated technologies.
















(1) TFP gains from trade with respect to autarky, in percentages, for di⁄erent values of r and ￿, with
Ti=Tn= 1.
Figure 2: TFP gains from trade with an asymmetric country (1)








TFP gain of country i
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(1) TFP gains from trade with respect to autarky, in percentages, for di⁄erent values of r and Ti=Tn,
with ￿ = 6:67.
19Pareto and lognormal distributions, as well as detailed computations for the normal case.
For all these distributions, we can prove the result that ZijZi ￿ Zn ￿rst-order stochastically
dominates Zi (that implies inequality (7)).
Thus, suppose that (Z1;Z2) has a bivariate normal distribution with the mean and
variance of Zi respectively denoted by ￿i and ￿2
i (i = 1;2), and correlation ￿ (j￿j < 1). For
simplicity, assume ￿2
1 = ￿2
2 = s2. The TFP gain of country 1 is:















where g and G are, respectively, the probability density function (p.d.f.) and the c.d.f. of
the standard normal variable, and where ￿v = s
p
2(1 ￿ ￿). Noting that the ratio g=(1 ￿ G)
is the hazard function of the normal distribution (which is strictly increasing in its own
argument), it is easy to verify that all the main results obtained with the multivariate FrØchet
are con￿rmed. Speci￿cally, the TFP gain from trade of a country is always: non-negative;
strictly increasing in the autarky TFP of the competitor country (￿2), and in the degree
of heterogeneity of domestic and foreign production (s); strictly decreasing in the domestic
autarky TFP (￿1) and in the correlation between domestic and foreign technologies (￿). In
particular, for what concerns the correlation, note that the largest TFP gain occurs as ￿
tends to ￿1.
5 Weighted TFP
Throughout the paper, we de￿ne TFP as the ￿rst moment of the distribution of industry
productivities. With this de￿nition, then, industry productivities are not weighted. In this
section, we consider a di⁄erent de￿nition of TFP in which we weight industry productivities
with the value of industry production. This is a more correct theoretical counterpart of any
empirical measure of TFP. Moreover, it is a de￿nition in which demand fully kicks in and
determines not only which industries produce some positive output, but also how much they
produce.
Let us start from the closed economy and, for the sake of simplicity, let us neglect
intermediate goods (￿ = 1) and non tradeables. By maintaining the assumption of CES








where Yi denotes income, which is given by wiLi, with Li being the number of workers.





zi ￿ !i (zi)dFi (zi) , (12)
20where we suppress the goods indices j in the integrals, and where the weight of good j is:












We can show the following result:










Proof. See Appendix E.1
In other words, in the closed economy the weighted TFP is equal to the ratio between
the moment of order ￿ and the moment of order ￿ ￿ 1 of the productivity distribution.
If we impose that Zi is FrØchet distributed, with ￿ > ￿, so that the moment of order ￿
exists (see footnote 7), we immediately obtain that:
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where B denotes Euler￿ s Beta function. Thus, with FrØchet distributed technologies, the
weighted TFP is proportional to the ￿rst moment. The proportionality constant gathers the
whole e⁄ect of demand. In particular, it is easy to show that c(￿) and, therefore, TFPw
i
are increasing in ￿. The intuition behind this result is straightforward. As the elasticity
of substitution increases, consumers become more willing to substitute high- with low-price
goods; then, demand for the latter increases. Low-price goods, in turn, are produced with a
high e¢ ciency and, since their weight rises, so does the weighted TFP.
Notice, in particular, the contrast between simple and weighted TFPs, that capture two
distinct phenomena. The former is una⁄ected by consumer preferences, as it only depends
on "intrinsic" technology (that, in a Schumpeterian fashion, can be thought of as a variable
determined by innovation and selection). The latter, on the contrary, is a⁄ected by consumer
preferences, because substitutability of goods determines the demand for each good, the value
of industry output and, in turn, the productivity weights.
It is important to note that the linear relationship between TFP and the ￿rst mo-
ment of the productivity distribution obtained in equation (14) is not speci￿c to the FrØchet,
but also holds for other commonly used distributions, such as the Pareto and the lognor-
mal. In particular, if Zi is Pareto(￿;￿) (i.e. Fi (z) = 1 ￿ (￿=z)
￿ with ￿ > ￿), then




(i.e. Zi = exp(Xi) and Xi ￿ Normal
￿
￿;s2￿
), then equation (14) holds
with c(￿) = exp
￿
s2 (￿ ￿ 1)
￿
. For both distributions, c(￿) is still increasing in the elasticity
of substitution ￿.
What about other distributions? If we assume that ￿ 2 N (still maintaining that the
moment of order ￿ exists), the following result holds:
E (Z￿










where ￿￿￿k is the central moment of order ￿￿k of Zi (see Balakrishnan and Nevzorov, 2003).
Thus, for any random variable Zi, its moment of order ￿ is a polynomial of degree ￿ in the
￿rst moment E (Zi), with coe¢ cients depending on the central moments of Zi. It follows
that:
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Hence, for any distribution Zi with E (Zi) su¢ ciently large, we can measure the weighted
TFP with the ￿rst moment. The largest measurement error that we can make converges to
zero as quickly as 1=[E (Zi)]
2.
Let us turn to the open economy and consider, ￿rst, what happens when the country
moves from autarky to no trade barriers (i.e. dni = 1 for any n and i). One can easily check
that, for any autarky distribution of productivities, the weighted TFP of the open economy
is still given by the ratio between the moment of order ￿ and the moment of order ￿ ￿ 1 of
the productivity distribution of the surviving industries. In other words, Proposition 3 still
holds with Zi (the autarky distribution) replaced by Zi;o (the distribution for the industries
that survive international competition).
If we impose the FrØchet assumption, the ratio between the weighted TFP of the open
and the closed economy is then given by the ratio between the ￿rst moments of Zi;o and Zi ￿
i.e. exactly the same ratio that we have considered in the previous sections. In fact, since Zi;o
has the same precision parameter as Zi, the proportionality constant c(￿) is the same in the
open and the closed economy and cancels out when we take the ratio between the two TFPs.
Hence, in the case of "free trade", considering the weighted instead of the non-weighted TFP
would not alter our main insights. Key to this result is that foreign consumers have the
same CES preferences as domestic consumers. Therefore, they demand the good j produced
by country i proportionally to z￿￿1
i (j), exactly as the domestic consumers of country i do.
The extra demand coming from abroad does not modify the composition of the demand for
domestic goods. Thus, if consumer preferences are identical across countries, then when any
country moves from autarky to free trade its aggregate TFP is a⁄ected only by a selection
e⁄ect and consumer preferences do not play any role.
With ￿nite trade barriers, instead, consumer preferences do play a role, even when
22they are identical all over the world. A simple example with two countries (n and i), no
intermediate goods (￿ = 1), no tradeable goods (so that Yi = wiLi) and FrØchet distributed
























where Zi;e is the random variable that describes the productivities of the exporters (which is
a FrØchet with state Ti + Tn (widni=wn)
￿ and precision ￿), and b ￿ 0 is a constant term that
depends on the "relative weight" of country n with respect to country i (measured by real
income) as well as on other fundamentals, including trade barriers.28 Equation (15) shows
that two distinct e⁄ects are at work. The weighted TFP of the open economy is still raised
by the exposure to international competition that forces less e¢ cient ￿rms to shut down ￿ a
"pure" selection e⁄ect. This e⁄ect is expressed by the ￿rst addendum of the right-hand side
of equation (15). As before, with FrØchet distributed technologies, this e⁄ect is measured by
the ratio between the ￿rst moments of Zi;o and Zi (the ratio between the moment of order
￿ and the moment of order ￿ ￿ 1 simpli￿es into the ￿rst moment, for both Zi;o and Zi).
However, now there is also a second e⁄ect (the second addendum of the right-hand side of
equation (15)), that depends on the productivity of exporters. After opening to trade, in
fact, exporters produce relatively more than non-exporters with respect to what they did
under autarky, because only these producers bene￿t from some extra demand coming from
abroad.29 Thus, the additional foreign demand for the domestic goods that are exported
leads to an increase in the weight of exported versus non-exported goods ￿ a market-share
reallocation e⁄ect.30 Since, on average, exporters are more productive than non-exporters (as
shown by the higher state of technology of Zi;e), this e⁄ect further raises the weighted TFP.31



























. On the other hand, as the country
approaches autarky (i.e. as dni ! +1), then b goes to zero and Zi;o ! Zi.
29Let j
0 (j
00) be a good that, after opening to trade, survives (does not survive) international competition and
is (is not) exported. Under autarky, the relative expenditure of domestic consumers on good j
0 with respect to
good j






00) (see Appendix E.1). After opening to trade, the relative expenditure






00) but, now, the is also some extra expenditure on j
0
by foreign consumers.
30This market-share reallocation e⁄ect is consistent with the evidence presented, e.g., in Pavcnik (2002) and
Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003).
31These results yield some implications for the e⁄ect of trade on the TFP of the whole economy. If we
compute it as a non-weighted average of all (tradeable and non-tradeable) industries, then trade always raises
TFP because the TFP of tradeables (weighted or non-weighted) rises after opening while that of the non-
tradeables does not change. If we measure the TFP of the whole economy with a weighted average of industry
productivities, the TFP of the whole economy certainly rises if labor is immobile between the tradeable and
the non-tradeable sector. If it is mobile, instead, a share of labor may ￿ ow from or to the non-tradeable
sector, and the e⁄ect on the weighted TFP of the whole economy will depend on the relative productivities of
tradeable and non tradeable industries.
23In the general setting with many countries, working out an analytic expression for the
market-share reallocation e⁄ect is extremely cumbersome (see Appendix E.2). Therefore, in
the next section we stick to the "pure" selection e⁄ect. This e⁄ect is a lower bound to the
overall e⁄ect of international competition. It is a good approximation of the overall e⁄ect of
trade if trade barriers are negligible or if the domestic country is large enough with respect
to the foreign country (in this case, b is very small).
6 Quantifying the selection e⁄ect
Let us go back to the baseline model described in Sections 2 and 3. An immediate implication
of Propositions 1 and 2 is that the contribution of international competition to the TFP of
the tradeable sector (hereafter identi￿ed with the manufacturing sector) due to the section
e⁄ect is simply given by the measure of openness ￿i raised to the 1=￿ power (one can obtain
it by substituting (P2) into (5) and dividing the result by the mean of Zi). In this section we
quantify this e⁄ect for a sample of 41 countries for which we have the data on manufacturing
production and trade required to measure ￿i. We carry out the exercise for the period
1985-2005.32
A value for ￿ can be obtained using two di⁄erent approaches. One is followed by EK,
who estimate ￿ using some testable implications of the model and ￿nd values between 3 and
13 (their preferred estimate is 8:28). An alternative strategy is proposed by Alvarez and
Lucas (2007), who calibrate ￿ by exploiting a connection between the models of EK and
Armington (1969). Although in the latter goods produced in di⁄erent countries are treated
as di⁄erent, the prediction that market shares are given by equation (1) also obtains in the
Armington model by replacing ￿ with ￿a ￿1, where ￿a is the Armington elasticity. Based on
the estimates of import elasticities surveyed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), Alvarez
and Lucas consider 6:67 as their benchmark calibration, from a range between 4 and 10. We
choose to follow Alvarez and Lucas and set ￿ = 6:67.33
Table 1 shows the contributions of international competition to the TFP of our sample
countries at ￿ve-year intervals between 1985 and 2005. In 2005, international competition
lifts the manufacturing TFP of the equally-weighted average country by 11 percent above its
autarky level (9 percent when calculated on the median). Across countries, the gain from
international competition ranges from 2 percent for India, to 39 percent for the Netherlands.34
32For a detailed description of data sources and the empirical methodology, see Appendix F.
33Notice that both Alvarez and Lucas and EK consider cross-sectional data. In our time-series analysis,
we take ￿ time-invariant. Finicelli, Pagano, and Sbracia (2009b) provide some evidence supporting this
assumption.
34The estimates of ￿
1=￿
i for di⁄erent values of ￿ can be derived with simple back-of-the-envelope calculations.
Setting ￿ = 8:28 (the preferred estimate of EK), in particular, the values reported in Table 1 would be slightly
24This contribution tends to be smaller for larger countries; its negative correlation with the
country size, however, is far from being perfect.35
Over time, the average contribution of international competition exhibits a neat positive
trend (from 6 to 11 percent between 1985 and 2005), which is shared by most countries. For
9 countries, however, the contribution of international competition does not pick in the latest
available year. Notice also that between the years 1995 and 2000, a period that includes the
Asian and Russian crises, the contribution of international competition declines for 7 out of
the 37 countries for which we have data for both years, with a particularly large drop for
Malaysia and Singapore (of 6 percentage points).
With some simple algebra, one can derive from the theory also the e⁄ect of international
competition on the real wage in the manufacturing sector (wi=pi), a measure of welfare in EK,
and ￿nd that this is equal to ￿i raised to the 1=￿￿ power (see also equation (15) in EK). By
setting ￿ = 0:33 ￿ a calibration in line with those of the literature ￿ and retaining ￿ = 6:67,
one can immediately obtain the values of ￿
1=￿￿
i from Table 1.36 For the equally-weighted
average country, we ￿nd that in 2005 international competition raises the real wage by over
35 percent with respect to the level that would have been observed under autarky (the rule
of thumb is that, with ￿ = 0:33, the e⁄ect on the real wage is approximately three times
larger than the e⁄ect on TFP).
To understand this result, suppose that the nominal wage is constant (in other words,
take the nominal wage as the numØraire). Then, the price level in the manufacturing sector
would decline by over 35 percent with respect to the closed economy. Because of perfect
competition, here the entire productivity gain is translated into lower prices, an e⁄ect that
accounts for 11 percentage points. However, there is also an indirect e⁄ect stemming from the
fact that a share 1￿￿ of the manufacturing goods also serves as intermediate goods. Hence,
the TFP e⁄ect on the price level is ampli￿ed by the availability of lower-price intermediate
inputs. In this example, with ￿ = 0:33, the overall TFP e⁄ect is three times larger than
the direct e⁄ect alone. (If only a subset of intermediate goods were tradeable, then this
ampli￿cation e⁄ect would be smaller).
smaller. For instance, in 2005 the average gain across countries would be around 9 percent.
35By measuring the country size by population, GDP in PPP or current prices, manufacturing production,
or manufacturing value added, we never obtain a correlation below ￿0:30.
36The parameter ￿ can be calibrated using two di⁄erent approaches. EK calibrate it as the cross-country
average of the labor share in gross manufacturing production. This calibration implies that labor is the sole
production factor and capital goods are comprised into intermediate goods. Alvarez and Lucas (2007), instead,
calibrate ￿ as the cross-country average of manufacturing value added over gross manufacturing production.
By doing so, these authors consider labor plus capital goods as the single production factor, which they label
as ￿ equipped labor￿ . For the 19 countries originally considered by EK, Finicelli, Pagano, and Sbracia (2008a)
report that, over the period 1985-2002, the ￿rst (second) calibration would provide annual values of ￿ between
0:19 (0:31) and 0:22 (0:34). Alvarez and Lucas also report that, using their calibration, the world average
value of ￿ in 1998 (from the UNIDO Industrial Statistics database) would be equal to 0:38.
25Table 1: Contribution of the selection e⁄ect to TFP in selected years (1)
country
Argentina* 0.9
2 2.2 2.9 4.3 4.9
Australia 3.4 3.5 5.0 7.0 4.4
Austria 8.7 10.4 11.7 16.2 18.3




Canada 6.9 7.2 10.8 11.8 10.6
Chile* 4.9 5.8 5.4 4.8
Czech Republic 6.7 11.5 13.4
Denmark 10.6 11.6 13.0 17.1 21.9
Finland 5.2 5.6 6.8 7.9 8.5
France 4.4 5.3 6.1 7.6 8.3
Germany 5.2 5.2 5.8 8.0 9.3
Greece 3.9 5.6 6.3 8.4 7.6
Hungary 6.6 8.1 16.4 18.6
Iceland 13.0 13.9 15.1 18.4 24.8
India* 1.2 1.1 1.6 1.9 2.4
7
Indonesia* 5.2 6.6 6.4 5.6 4.9
Ireland 13.5 15.2 15.8 18.2 20.0
5
Israel* 9.4 9.2 9.8
7
Italy 3.7 3.6 4.7 5.4 5.6
Japan 1.6 1.5 1.7 2.2 2.7
Republic of Korea 3.5 3.5 4.2 4.8 4.8
Malaysia* 8.7 10.0 14.7 9.0 9.2
6
Mexico 2.1 7.3 9.5 10.1
Netherlands 14.9 17.1 16.8 26.4 39.3
New Zealand 6.3 6.9 7.3 8.9
Norway 9.0 9.6 9.7 11.2 10.9
Philippines* 3.4 4.4 6.2
Poland 3.4 4.7 7.0 9.3
Portugal 3.3 6.1 7.2 9.9 10.2
Russian Federation* 3.7
3 3.2 4.1
Singapore* 16.2 17.0 22.4 16.6 23.6
7
Slovak Republic 14.6 21.1
South Africa* 2.1 4.0 3.0 3.4
Spain 2.7 3.5 4.5 6.3 6.6
Sweden 6.8 6.7 8.5 9.7 11.1




Turkey* 3.2 4.4 5.8
United Kingdom 5.6 6.1 7.6 9.1 10.1
6
United States 1.6 2.2 2.7 3.5 3.9
mean 6.1 6.5 7.8 9.5 11.1
median 5.2 5.6 6.7 8.9 9.3
number of countries 28 35 39 39 37
2005 1985 1990 1995 2000
Source: authors￿calculations on OECD STAN data; * UNIDO IDSB data.
Notes: (1) Values of ￿
1=￿
i ￿1, in percentage, for each country i; (2) 1984; (3) 1994; (4) 1996; (5) 2002;
(6) 2003; (7) 2004.
26Thanks to the ampli￿cation e⁄ect on real wages, the welfare gains are non-negligible,
even for large countries where the mere TFP gains due to the selection e⁄ect reported in
Table 1 appear small. For instance, suppose that the United States raise trade barriers so
as to go back to the degree of openness observed in 1985. This would imply a decline of 2:3
percent in their TFP, and a drop as large as 7:3 percent in their real wages.
7 Conclusion
Exploiting the probabilistic formulation of the Ricardian model developed by Eaton and
Kortum (2002), we have analyzed the theoretical foundations of the relationship between
trade and TFP. We have shown that the correlation between the autarky distributions of
industry productivities is key in determining the sign and size of TFP growth after opening
to trade. First, we have established that independence yields the remarkable implication that
trade openness always raises TFP. Second, if technologies are correlated this ￿nding, while not
generalizable, still holds for important families of joint distributions of productivities, such
as the multivariate FrØchet, Pareto, normal, and lognormal. These results warrant further
research on the statistical distribution of productivities (a novel primitive of modern models
of growth and international trade), an issue about which the literature is still inconclusive.
Consistently with the Ricardian approach, the law of comparative advantage is the
driving force behind the selection e⁄ect. In this setting, any industry, even a high-productivity
one, can exit the market, but this happens with a probability that is lower for higher-
productivity industries.
Our analysis also delivers a simple model-based measure of the selection e⁄ect that has
a straightforward empirical implementation. We show that the TFP of an open economy is
equal to its TFP under autarky augmented by a factor that depends solely on its aggregate
production and trade. This ￿nding, which is una⁄ected by measuring TFP with a weighted
instead of a non-weighted average of industry productivities, enables to easily quantify the
magnitude of TFP gains from trade.
27Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Before computing Fi;o from equation (4), we show that the goods produced by country i
are all and only those for which it holds pii (j) ￿ pik (j) for any k. If pii (j) ￿ pik (j) for
any k, then good j is produced by country i and sold at home. Hence, we only need to
show that there is no good j which is produced by country i, exported in a country n 6= i,
and not sold at home. Clearly, if such a good is not sold at home, it means that there is
another country, call it k (k 6= i), that sells it in country i at a lower cost. More formally,
then, we need to show that there is no good j such that: (i) pii (j) > pik (j) for some k;
and (ii) pni (j) < pnl (j) for some n and for any l 6= i. Suppose, by contradiction, that
there exists such a good j. The inequality (i) means that: ci=zi (j) > ckdik=zk (j). The
inequality (ii) is equivalent to: cidni=zi (j) < cldnl=zl (j) for any l 6= i. Now take l = k.
Then: cidni=zi (j) < ckdnk=zk (j). However, from the ￿rst inequality we can also obtain:
cidni=zi (j) > ckdikdni=zk (j) ￿ ckdnk=zk (j), where the last part follows from the triangle
inequality and contradicts the inequality (ii).
We now turn to the computation of Fi;o (z). To ￿nd the distribution of the TFP
of country i (TFPi), we consider ￿rst the price distribution of the goods that country i
"submits" to country n. Denote this random variable by Pni and its c.d.f. by Wni. Recalling
that pni (j) = cidni=zi (j) for any good j, EK show that:











where Fi is the c.d.f. of Zi. By setting: ￿ni = Ti (cidni)
￿￿, we can write the p.d.f. of Pni as:





thus, Pni has a Weibull distribution.
Now let us turn to TFPi, whose distribution is:
Fi;o (z) = Pr
￿





































Pik ; Zi < z
￿









































where ￿i is given by equation (P1).










in other words, Zi;o ￿ Fr￿ echet(￿i;￿).
B Proof of Proposition 2
Plugging the expression of costs (equation (3)) into equation (P1), and multiplying and
dividing by Ti we can write:










































C Conditional mean under independence
In this section we prove that E (ZijZi ￿ Zn) ￿ E (Zi) for any Zi and Zn independent random
variables (which we take with absolutely continuous distributions and support in R) with,
29for obvious reasons, Pr(Zi ￿ Zn) > 0. Let us denote with fi and fn the p.d.f. of Zi and Zn;
fi;n = fi ￿ fn denotes the p.d.f. of the random vector (Zi;Zn).
We can write:


















zi ￿ fi;n (zi;zn) ￿ IS (zi;zn)dzidzn ,
where IS denotes the indicator function of the set S and:
S =
￿
(zi;zn) 2 R2 : zi ￿ zn
￿
.





zi ￿ fi;n (zi;zn) ￿ IS (zi;zn)dzidzn ￿ E (Zi) ￿ Pr(Zi ￿ Zn) . (16)
We now show the intermediate result that:
Z
R
zi ￿ fi (zi) ￿ I[zn;+1) (zi)dzi ￿ E (Zi) ￿ Pr(Zi ￿ zn) , 8zn 2 R. (17)
There are three possible cases: (i) if Pr(Zi ￿ zn) = 0, then both sides of the inequality are
equal to zero; (ii) if Pr(Zi ￿ zn) = 1, then both sides of the inequality are equal to E (Zi);
(iii) if 0 < Pr(Zi ￿ zn) < 1, then from:
E (ZijZi ￿ zn) ￿ zn ￿ E (ZijZi < zn) ,
it follows that:
R




R zi ￿ fi (zi) ￿ I(￿1;zn) (zi)dzi
Pr(Zi < zn)
.
Multiplying both sides of the inequality by Pr(Zi ￿ zn) ￿ Pr(Zi < zn) and adding them the
term:
Pr(Zi ￿ zn) ￿
Z
R
zi ￿ fi (zi) ￿ I[zn;+1) (zi)dzi ,
completes the proof that (17) holds.





zi ￿ fi (zi) ￿ I[zn;+1) (zi)dzi
￿
￿ fn (zn)dzn ￿ E (Zi)
Z
R
Pr(Zi ￿ zn) ￿ fn (zn)dzn .

















fi;n (zi;zn) ￿ IS (zi;zn)dzidzn
= Pr(Zi ￿ Zn) .





zi ￿ fi;n (zi;zn) ￿ IS (zi;zn)dzidzn ,
and this proves the necessary and su¢ cient condition (16).
D TFP gains with correlated distributions
In this section we compute TFP gains for a variety of multivariate distributions. We focus
on common distributions whose margins are consistent with those considered by theoretical
or empirical studies about the distribution of plant-, ￿rm-, or industry-level productivities or
sizes, such as the FrØchet, Pareto, and lognormal distributions. Notice that these distributions
are right-skewed and heavy-tailed. Thus, we also consider the normal distribution in order
to con￿rm that the result that TFP increases after opening to trade also holds for symmetric
distributions with light (exponential) tails. For all these distributions, we prove the result that
ZijZi ￿ Zn ￿rst-order stochastically dominates Zi, a result that implies: E (ZijZi ￿ Zn) ￿
E (Zi).
D.1 FrØchet
Recall that, for any zi > 0 and zn > 0:













is the c.d.f. of a bivariate FrØchet. The corresponding p.d.f., which we denote with  i;n, is a
complicated function of (zi;zn). However, notice that the distribution of ZijZi ￿ Zn is:
Pr(Zi < zjZi ￿ Zn) =






















































































































Hence, we can compute the denominator of (18):













Computing the numerator of (18) and dividing it by Pr(Zi ￿ Zn), we immediately
recognize that:













Hence, taking the ￿rst moment of this distribution and dividing it by the ￿rst moment of
Zi we ￿nd the TFP gain. Since the state of technology of ZijZi ￿ Zn is larger than that of
Zi, the properties of the FrØchet distribution imply that ZijZi ￿ Zn ￿rst-order stochastically
dominates Zi.
D.2 Pareto (Mardia￿ s Type I)
For zi > 1, zn > 1, and ￿ > 0, the random vector (Zi;Zn) has a standard bivariate Pareto
distribution of Mardia￿ s Type I (see Mardia, 1970) if its p.d.f. is:
fi;n (zi;zn) = ￿(￿ + 1)
1
(zi + zn ￿ 1)
(￿+2) .
The correlation between Zi and Zn is 1=￿ (if ￿ > 2). We assume that ￿ > 2 to grant that
￿rst and second moments exist.
The p.d.f. of Zi and Zn are fi (z) = fn (z) = ￿z￿￿￿1, the corresponding c.d.f. are
Fi (z) = Fn (z) = 1 ￿ z￿￿ , and their ￿rst moments are equal to:
E (Zi) = E (Zn) =
￿
￿ ￿ 1
, for ￿ > 1 .
We want to compute:
Pr(Zi < zjZi ￿ Zn) =
















Hence, we need to calculate:
Z zi
1

















32Computing the denominator of (20) we obtain:





























































z￿ + 1 ,
which has support in [1;+1). Note that
F (z) ￿ Fi (z) 8z > 1 ;
in other words, ZijZi ￿ Zn ￿rst-order stochastically dominates Zi. It follows that E (ZijZi ￿ Zn) ￿
E (Zi). In particular, the p.d.f. of ZijZi ￿ Zn is:









and its ￿rst moment is:

























































and the TFP gain immediately obtains by dividing by E (Zi).
33D.3 Normal
If (Z1;Z2) has a bivariate normal distribution with the mean and variance of Zi equal to ￿i
and ￿2
i (i = 1;2), with ￿2
1 = ￿2
2 = s2, and with the correlation between Z1 and Z2 given by
￿, then it is easy to verify a useful property: the variables U = Z1 + Z2 and V = Z1 ￿ Z2
are normally distributed and independent from each other.37 Note also that the standard
deviation of V is ￿v = s
p
2(1 ￿ ￿).
Hence, we can write Z1 = (U + V )=2, while Z1 ￿ Z2 is equivalent to V ￿ 0. Therefore:

































where the last step follows from the properties of normal and truncated normal random
variables (with g and G respectively equal to the p.d.f. and c.d.f. of a standard normal
random variable). After simplifying and dividing by ￿1, we immediately obtain:















The stronger result that ZijZi ￿ Zn ￿rst-order stochastically dominates Zi follows from the
properties of normal distributions and the fact that the former variable has a higher mean
and a lower variance.
D.4 Lognormal






￿ where, for simplic-
ity, we take ￿2
1 = ￿2
2 = s2 ￿ then, by de￿nition, (Y1;Y2) is a bivariate lognormal distribution.
Using the same variable U = Z1 + Z2 and V = Z1 ￿ Z2 built above, we have:




























































= E (Y1) .
37It is easy to check that Cov (U;V ) = 0. Since (U;V ) is bivariate normally distributed, then uncorrelation
implies independence.
34To compute the conditional mean, consider that since the variable Z1jZ1 ￿ Z2 is
normal, then the variable exp(Z1)jZ1 ￿ Z2 is lognormal. Therefore:










where ￿ ￿1 = E (Z1jZ1 ￿ Z2) and ￿ ￿2
1 = V ar(Z1jZ1 ￿ Z2). In particular:




where ￿v = s
p
2(1 ￿ ￿) and ￿ = (￿2 ￿ ￿1)=￿v and ￿ is the hazard function of a standard
normal distribution. For ￿ ￿2
1, using the variables U and V once again we have:
￿ ￿2




















(1 + ￿) +
s2
2










￿ (￿) = ￿(￿)[￿(￿) ￿ ￿] .
As above, the stronger result that ZijZi ￿ Zn ￿rst-order stochastically dominates Zi follows
from the properties of lognormal distributions and the fact that the former variable has a
higher mean and a lower variance.
E Weighted TFP
E.1 Closed and open economies
We start this section by considering the weighted TFP of the closed economy, proving Propo-
sition 3. Recall, from equation (13), that !i (zi (j)) = p￿￿1
i =p￿￿1
i (j). Prices are equal to
marginal costs, then p￿￿1
i (j) = w￿￿1
i =z￿￿1
















. By substituting it into equation (12), Proposition
3 immediately obtains.
We now turn to the open economy and consider an example with two countries, n and
i, and defer a brief discussion about the extension to N countries to the next section. For the
35sake of simplicity, we neglect intermediate (￿ = 1) and non-tradeable goods (then Yi = wiLi).
With ￿nite trade barriers, we need to consider separately non-exported and exported goods.
If the good j is not exported, then the demand ci (j) is the same as in equation (11)
(where, however, in the open economy the price index pi depends also on foreign technologies,
because some goods are imported). Hence, the weight of good j is the same as in equation
(13). In particular, equation (21) still holds, with E(Z￿￿1
i ) replaced by E(Z￿￿1
i;o ). Note that,
even though some goods are imported, the price index of country i depends solely on the
productivities of country i￿ s industries. This result follows from a property of the EK model,
that the prices of the goods that country i actually buys from any other country (including
i itself) is the same as the overall price distribution of country i (i.e. when a country starts
selling in country i, it does that up to the point at which the price distribution of the goods
that it sells in i is the same as the overall price distribution of i).
If the good j is exported, then it is demanded by both countries i and n. The weight
of good j becomes: !i (zi (j)) = pi (j)cw (j)Y ￿1
i = Li (j)L￿1
i , where cw (j) = ci (j) + cn (j)
is the total (world) demand for good j. Recalling that the price of good j produced by
country i and sold in the destination market n is pni (z) = pi (j)dni, we can break the weight
!i (zi (j)) into two di⁄erent addenda: pi (j)ci (j)Y ￿1
i and pni (j)cn (j)(dniYi)
￿1. The former
addendum is given by equation (21), with E(Z￿￿1
i ) replaced by E(Z￿￿1
i;o ). The latter, that
depends on demand in country n, is: p￿￿1
n p1￿￿
ni (j)Yn (dniYi)
￿1. In particular, from equation
(2) it follows that: pn = pi (￿i=￿n)
1=￿.





























zi (j)!i (j)dFi;o (j) .
Anticipating the result developed in the next section that:
Fi;o (z) = (1 ￿ ￿)Fi;d (z) + ￿Fi;e (z) , (22)









i;o = (1 ￿ ￿)
Z +1
0
zi (j)!i (j)dFi;d (j) + ￿
Z +1
0
























































This results proves equation (15), with b = ￿￿. Using equation (2) (as well as equation (12)
in EK), notice that the "extra weight" given to the exporters is:








As the country approaches autarky (din;dni ! +1), then ￿ ! 0, Zi;d ! Zi;o and, in
turn, Zi;o ! Zi; in other words, TFPw
i;o !TFPw
i : As the country approaches free trade













E.2 Productivity distribution of exporters and non-exporters
In this section, we compute the distribution of productivities for exporters and non-exporters
and prove equation (22). As above, we consider an example with two countries, neglecting
intermediate and non-tradeable goods. Recall that country i produces good j if and only
if zi (j) > zn (j)wi [wndin]
￿1. Among these surviving industries, good j is: (i) exported ,
zi (j) > zn (j)widniw￿1
n ; (ii) not exported , zn (j)wi [wndin]
￿1 < zi (j) < zn (j)widniw￿1
n .
Assuming that Zi ￿ Fr￿ echet(Ti;￿), Proposition 1 provides the distribution of produc-
tivities for the industries that survive international competition in the general case. In our




Similarly, we can compute the c.d.f. Fi;e of the distribution of the exporters as:
Fi;e (z) = Pr
￿














Solving the corresponding integrals, we ￿nd that Zi;e is FrØchet distributed, with state of
technology Ti +Tn (widni)
￿ w￿￿
n and precision ￿. Note, in particular, that E (Zi;e) > E (Zi;o)
and that, as the country approaches free trade , then Zi;e ! Zi;o.
37Denoting by Zi;d the distribution of the producers who sell their goods only domestically
(non-exporters) and by Fi;d its c.d.f., we have:
Fi;d (z) = Pr
￿
Zi < zjZnwi (wndin)

















￿1 < Zi < Znwidniw￿1
n
￿ .





￿1 < Zi < Znwidniw￿1
n
￿








Zi > Znwi (wndin)
￿1
￿
from which equation (22) follows. In other words, Fi;o (z) is a mixture between the distribution
of non-exporters and the distribution of exporters, with weights respectively equal to 1 ￿ ￿
and ￿, where ￿ is given by equation (23)
In a more general setting (with N > 2), we can ￿nd a closed-form expression for the
distribution of Zi;e (that appears in equation (15)), but the weighting scheme !i (j); which
is needed to compute TFPw
i;o, becomes increasingly cumbersome. Let us ￿rst compute Zi;e.
Denote by Zi;e;n the productivity distribution for the goods that country i exports to country
n. To generalize condition (i) above, note that country i exports good j in country n ,
zi (j) > widni maxk6=i [zk (j)=(wkdnk)]. It is easy to check that Zi;e;n is FrØchet distributed,
with state Ti +
P
k6=i Tk (widni=wkdnk)
￿ and precision ￿. By the same token, note that good
j is exported if and only if the following condition holds:










In other words, Zi;e = minn6=i (Zi;e;n); therefore:
Fi;e (z) = 1 ￿
Y
n6=i
[1 ￿ Fi;e;n (z)] ,











Clearly, Zi;e is composed by the productivity distributions for the goods that country i exports
in country n (n 6= i), the productivity distributions for the goods that i exports in countries
n and k (n 6= i and k < n), etc.. Overall, this a mixture of 2N￿1 ￿ 1 FrØchet distributions;
with N = 41, as in our empirical analysis, it would be a mixture of about 1012 distributions.
What about the weights needed to compute TFPw
i;o? In general, each good j has a
di⁄erent weight, depending on whether and where it is exported. For any good j, we can
write: !i (j) / z￿￿1
i (j)(1 + ￿(j)), where the "extra weight" ￿(j) depends on the destination
38market of each good j (as just noticed, with N countries, we have 2N￿1 ￿1 di⁄erent possible
destinations for exports). When we substitute !i (j) into TFPw
i;o, we still get two terms (like
in equation (15)). The ￿rst is E(Z￿
i;o)=E(Z￿￿1
i;o ), and re￿ ects the "pure" selection e⁄ect; the
second, which is more complicated because weights have to be attributed to each possible
destination market, re￿ ects the market-share reallocation e⁄ect.
F Data sources
Our main data source is OECD STAN 2008, which provides data on production and trade
for the manufacturing sector as a whole. For the countries not covered by STAN, we use data
from UNIDO IDSB 2008, from which we recover production and trade of the manufacturing
sector by aggregating data available for all manufacturing industries at the 4-digit Level of
ISIC classi￿cation (Revision 3 for the period 1990-2005, Revision 2 for 1985-1989). For the
major industrial countries, which are included in both databases, results from using one or
the other source are essentially the same.
For Belgium, which is covered by STAN, we use IDSB data because STAN provides
the inconsistent result that Belgian manufacturing exports are larger than its manufacturing
production, an artifact of its role as entrep￿t country. Using disaggregated data from IDSB,
then, we can neglect manufacturing industries in which production is either zero or missing,
a simple method that is su¢ cient to return exports that are smaller than production. We
cannot exclude, however, that entrep￿t trade in￿ ates export and import ￿ ows also for other
sectors where Belgian production is reported, as well as for other countries.
Finally, notice that in the theoretical model, the budget constraint implies that exports
and imports are equal.38 Therefore, in equation (6) one could use exports and imports inter-
changeably. For this reason, we have computed the values reported in Table 1 by replacing
EXPi and IMPi with the mean (EXPi + IMPi)=2.
38For an extension of the model to the case of "unbalanced trade", see Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2007).
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